Jerry R. Skees(2010)通過研究認(rèn)為,具有政府補貼的農(nóng)業(yè)保險投入成本過大,問題較多,而且會導(dǎo)致潛在的低效率,如果從效率的角度衡量,政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險顯然是失敗的,因此農(nóng)業(yè)保險是否需要政府介入還有待驗證,他認(rèn)為,美國模式并不是適合所有國家,美國農(nóng)業(yè)保險模式還存在諸多問題,政府補貼成本過高在一定程度上會導(dǎo)致市場失靈,政府的角色應(yīng)當(dāng)是提供巨災(zāi)基金,建立風(fēng)險援助機制,依靠市場來經(jīng)營單一責(zé)任風(fēng)險。
Bruce A. Babcock,Chad E Hart( 2011) 通過研究如何使政府的保費補貼效用最大化,指出如果政府實行無差別化的保險補貼,效果顯然是無法使保費補貼效用最大化,他們建議應(yīng)該對農(nóng)民進(jìn)行有效區(qū)分,分別從農(nóng)業(yè)保險提供的保險責(zé)任和保障水平入手,對那些有效保險需求相對較低也更加貧困的農(nóng)民給予更多保費補貼。認(rèn)為政府加大對農(nóng)業(yè)保費的補貼力度導(dǎo)致兩方面的結(jié)果,一方面有助于農(nóng)民購買保障水平更高的農(nóng)業(yè)保險產(chǎn)品,另一方面農(nóng)民購買高保障的農(nóng)業(yè)保險產(chǎn)品可以消除高保費成本所帶來的思想焦慮。
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